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A	chaotic	Brexit	is	still	a	possibility
The	terms	of	the	political	debate	about	Brexit	in	the	aftermath	of	the	General	Election	are	gradually
becoming	clearer.	Since	the	Brexit	project	is	an	essentially	irrational	one,	its	discussion	will	always
tend	towards	paradox	and	conundrum.	Nevertheless,	the	weeks	since	the	General	Election	have
clarified	the	choices	with	which	the	British	government	and	other	political	actors	are	likely	to	find
themselves	confronted	over	the	coming	months.	How	they	will	react	to	these	choices	remains	as
much	a	matter	of	speculation	as	ever.	A	chaotic	Brexit	remains	a	distinct	possibility,	writes	Brendan
Donnelly.	
The	major	theme	of	Theresa	May’s	European	rhetoric	during	the	election	campaign	was	that	of	resolute
determination	to	extract	the	maximum	number	of	concessions	from	her	European	partners	in	the	forthcoming
Brexit	negotiations.	A	reinforced	Parliamentary	majority	would	supposedly	help	her	in	this	endeavour.	An
important	and	contradictory	minor	theme	of	her	election	campaign	was,	however,	that	of	her	need	to	enjoy	a
strong	majority	in	the	new	Parliament	in	order	to	lessen	her	dependence	on	the	most	radical	Eurosceptic
elements	of	the	Conservative	Parliamentary	Party.	This	mixture	of	messages	was	opportunistic	in	its	attempt	to
appeal	to	a	variety	of	potential	Conservative	voters.		It	also	prefigured	one	possible	outcome	of	the	Brexit
negotiations,	whereby	the	Conservative	Prime	Minister	of	the	day	will	be	driven	by	economic	and	political	reality
to	uncongenial	compromises,	but	will	need	to	conceal	these	concessions	by	a	show	of	belligerent	self-
congratulation.	Unfortunately	for	May,	the	disastrous	outcome	of	the	election	she	provoked	has	strengthened	her
negotiating	hand	neither	with	the	rest	of	the	European	Union,	nor	with	potentially	recalcitrant	elements	of	the
Conservative	Party.
Ironically,	this	recalcitrance	within	May’s	party	has	come	since	the	General	Election	most	notably	from	an
unexpected	source,	namely	that	minority	of	Conservative	MPs	who	remain	doubtful	about	the	whole	concept	of
Brexit	and	who	fear	the	economic	dangers	implicit	in	a	chaotic	British	withdrawal	from	the	Union.	There	seems
little	doubt	that	their	most	prominent	representative,	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	Philip	Hammond,	would
have	been	dismissed	from	office	had	May	won	a	resounding	victory	on	8	June.	Her	weakness	after	the	results	of
the	General	Election	became	known	prevented	her	from	carrying	out	this	dismissal.	Hammond	has	used	this
reprieve	to	stake	out	an	approach	to	Brexit	very	different	in	tone	and	potentially	even	in	substance	from	that	of
May	before	the	election.	Unlike	the	Prime	Minister,	Hammond	has	never	affected	to	believe	that	British
withdrawal	from	the	European	Union	is	an	opportunity	containing	promises	of	a	better	tomorrow.	He	sees	it	rather
as	a	problem	to	be	managed	in	a	way	doing	the	least	possible	economic	damage	to	the	United	Kingdom.	The
slowing	down	of	the	British	economy	in	the	first	half	of	this	year	has	served	to	reinforce	and	make	more	credible
his	reservations.
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Theresa	May	speaks	during	an	international	conference	on	Somalia	at	the	Lancaster	House	in
London	on	May	11,	2017.	(DOD	photo	by	U.S.	Air	Force	Staff	Sgt.	Jette	Carr),	(Flickr)	licensed
under	CC	BY	2.0
In	essence,	the	indecisive	result	of	the	General	Election	has	made	it	possible	for	Philip	Hammond	and	those	who
support	him	to	provide	some	check	at	least	to	what	had	seemed	an	irresistible	momentum	within	the
Conservative	government	towards	a	non-negotiated	British	withdrawal	from	the	European	Union.	While	publicly
endorsing	May’s	desire	eventually	to	leave	both	the	European	single	market	and	the	Customs	Union,	Hammond
has	put	back	into	the	mainstream	of	Conservative	thinking	the	concept	of	a	substantial	transitional	arrangement
before	these	desired	goals	are	achieved.	He	does	not	appear	to	share	the	Prime	Minister’s	view	that	“no	deal	is
better	than	a	bad	deal.”	His	preferred	formula	is	that	“no	deal	is	better	than	a	deal	that	punishes	the	UK.”
Hammond	is	unlikely	to	believe	that	the	UK’s	European	partners	genuinely	want	to	punish	the	United	Kingdom.
Like	Donald	Tusk,	he	knows	that	the	British	government	is	doing	a	good	job	of	punishing	the	UK	already	by
pursuing	the	nonsensicality	of	Brexit.
It	would,	however,	be	wrong	to	forget	that	Hammond	and	his	supporters	only	constitute	one	wing	of	today’s
Conservative	Party.	May’s	new	ministerial	team	has	had	to	find	room	for	such	prominent	Eurosceptics	as	Michael
Gove	and	Steve	Baker.	For	a	number	of	reasons,	the	most	radical	Eurosceptics	within	the	Conservative	Party
have	decided	in	the	short	term	to	acquiesce	in	May’s	continuing	leadership	of	the	Conservative	Party;	they	have
tolerated	the	major	concession	made	by	the	British	side	on	19	June,	that	of	accepting	the	EU’s	preferred
timetable	for	the	Brexit	negotiations;		their	major	representatives	such	as	Dr.	Fox	no	longer	regard	as	taboo	the
possibility	of	a	limited	“transition	period”	after	March,	2019;	and	May’s	government	has	been	allowed	to	make	an
	initial	offer	to	its	European	partners	on	the	subject	of	reciprocal	rights	for	British	and	EU	citizens	after	Brexit.		But
it	would	be	optimistic	in	the	extreme	to	imagine	that	the	power	of	radical	Euroscepticism	or	the	determination	of
its	many	representatives	within	the	Conservative	Party	have	been	broken	by	the	results	of	the	General	Election.
Ironically,	the	agreement	to	discuss	in	the	first	stage	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	only	the	issues	strictly	relating	to
the	UK’s	leaving	the	European	Union	may	give	the	radical	wing	of	the	Conservative	Party	its	best	chance	to	seize
once	more	the	political	advantage.	May’s	initial	proposals	concerning	the	reciprocal	rights	of	EU	and	British
citizens	after	Brexit	have	met	with	a	distinctly	cool	response	from	her	European	partners.	The	proposals	had	by
contrast	been	seen	from	the	British	side	as	a	“generous	offer,”	an	obviously	self-serving	description	that	did	not
long	survive	contact	with	negotiating	reality.	This	underlying	difference	of	perception	does	not	bode	well	for	the
further	course	of	negotiations.	When	these	negotiations	turn	to	the	so-called	“divorce	bill,”	the	domestic	difficulties
faced	by	the	Conservative	government	in	coming	to	any	agreement	with	its	European	partners	will	be	extreme.	It
would	be	amazing	if	those	favouring	a	non-consensual	Brexit	in	the	Conservative	Party	did	not	use	this	element
of	the	Brexit	negotiations	as	a	substantial	stick	with	which	to	beat	both	the	European	Union	negotiators	and	any
British	ministers	set	upon	compromise	in	this	thorny	issue.
Any	compromise	on	the	financial	settlement	will	be	ripe	for	exaggeration	and
misrepresentation	in	the	Eurosceptic	press
Although	in	terms	of	overall	government	expenditure	the	sums	involved	in	the	European	budget	are	small,	they
have	always	produced	disproportionately	fierce	political	controversy,	especially	in	the	United	Kingdom.	The	Leave
campaign	during	last	year’s	referendum	effectively	exploited	the	resentment	of	wide	swathes	of	British	public
opinion	that	the	UK	has	always	been	a	net	contributor	to	the	EU	budget.	Any	conceivable	compromise	on	the
financial	settlement	for	Brexit	will	be	ripe	for	damaging	exaggeration	and	misrepresentation	in	the	Eurosceptic
press.	It	is	almost	inconceivable	that	a	weakened	May,	or	indeed	any	other	Conservative	leader,	would	be	able	to
persuade	the	Conservative	Party	to	accept	a	financial	settlement	involving	at	the	least	many	tens	of	billions	of
euros.
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If	the	field	of	the	financial	settlement	is	one	on	which	it	is	advantageous	for	them	to	fight,	the	more	far-sighted
radical	Eurosceptics	in	the	Conservative	Party	may	also	realise	that	all	later	alternative	fields	will	be	increasingly
problematic	for	them.	Once	the	European	Council	concludes	that	“sufficient	progress”	has	been	made	on	the
initial	issues	of	Brexit,	including	the	financial	settlement,	negotiations	will	begin	on	the	future	trading	relationship
between	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	European	Union.	The	remorseless	progress	of	these	detailed	negotiations,
carried	out	in	the	fullest	glare	of	publicity	ensured	by	the	EU’s	negotiators,	is	likely	over	time	to	reveal	in	the
starkest	terms	the	true	absurdity	of	the	Brexit	proposition.	During	the	negotiations	with	Michel	Barnier	and	his
team,	it	will	become	clear	to	the	British	public	that	in	these	negotiations	the	British	government	is	confronted	with
a	limited	and	unpalatable	range	of	options.	It	can	choose	a	merely	damaging	Brexit,	changing	as	little	as	possible,
as	slowly	as	possible	of	the	present	economic	and	trading	relations	between	the	United	Kingdom	and	the
European	Union;	or	it	can	choose	a	disastrous	Brexit,	sweeping	away	to	the	greatest	extent	possible	the	basis	on
which	commerce	has	been	conducted	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	over	the	past	forty	years	and	creating	an
unpredictable	economic	environment	in	which	the	only	certainty	is	that	the	immediate	future	will	be	worse	than
the	recent	past.		If	the	second	phase	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	ever	comes	into	being,	they	are	likely	to	provide	a
daily	demonstration	of	the	implausibility	of	the	goal	of	“making	a	success	of	Brexit.”
the	second	phase	of	negotiations	are	likely	to	provide	a	demonstration	of	the
implausibility	of	“making	a	success	of	Brexit”
There	is	an	added	attraction	for	the	most	uncompromising	advocates	of	an	unnegotiated	Brexit	if	they	can
prevent	the	British	government	from	ever	proceeding	to	the	second	phase	of	the	Brexit	negotiations.	It	is	that
such	a	course	of	action	will	facilitate	the	marginalisation	of	the	House	of	Commons	in	the	Brexit	process.	An
impasse	in	the	negotiations,	if	continued	until	29	March	2019,	will	ensure	that	the	United	Kingdom	leaves	the
European	Union	on	that	date,	without	need	for	any	Parliamentary	involvement	beyond	occasional	crocodile	tears
in	the	Commons	from	British	ministers	lamenting	the	intransigence	of	their	European	negotiating	partners.	If	this
intransigence	could	be	presented	as	manifesting	itself	particularly	in	the	financial	settlement	for	Brexit,	the
government	would	feel	itself	on	strong	domestic	political	ground	to	exercise	intransigence	of	its	own.
Over	the	past	year,	an	interesting	development	in	the	use	of	the	term	“hard	Brexit”	has	occurred.	Originally,	the
term	referred	simply	to	leaving	the	internal	market	and/or	leaving	the	Customs	Union	when	the	UK	left	the
European	Union.	Many	representatives	of	the	“Leave”	camp	during	the	referendum	specifically	disavowed	any
such	intention.	Under	predictable	pressure	from	her	backbenchers,	May	then	made	clear	at	the	beginning	of	this
year	that	she	favoured	leaving	both	the	internal	market	and	the	Customs	Union.	The	term	“hard	Brexit”	then
metamorphosed	into	one	still	signifying	leaving	the	internal	market	and	Customs	Union	but	doing	so	without	any
agreement	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	to	replace	these	long-standing	pillars	of	their	economic	relationship.
There	will	undoubtedly	be	within	May’s	Conservative	Party	many	and	highly-paced	advocates	of	precisely	such	a
course.	Continuing	stalemate	in	the	first	phase	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	might	well	be	their	preferred	option	for
bringing	that	about.
the	General	Election	has	not	banished	entirely	the	possibility	of	a	“hard	Brexit”
It	is	clear	therefore	that	the	General	Election	has	not	banished	entirely	the	possibility	of	a	“hard	Brexit”	as	recently
redefined.	If	the	first	phase	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	does	seem	to	have	arrived	at	a	definitive	stalemate,	possibly
towards	the	end	of	the	year,	the	Conservative	Prime	Minister	of	the	day	will	be	faced	with	challenging
Parliamentary	arithmetic.		The	DUP	has	undertaken	to	support	Conservative	policy	on	Brexit,	but	might	well	baulk
at	supporting	the	reintroduction	of	customs	and	other	barriers	at	the	Irish	border,	a	direct	consequence	of	a	“hard
Brexit.”	The	SNP	as	a	whole	and	the	great	majority	of	Labour	MPs	could	be	expected	to	oppose	the	emerging
Conservative	failure	to	move	to	the	second	phase	of	the	Brexit	negotiations.	The	Conservative	leader	will	need
the	Conservative	Parliamentary	Party	substantially	united	at	his	or	her	back.	As	ever,	much	will	turn	on	the
decisions	of	the	now	small	minority	of	pro-European	Conservative	MPs.	It	has	been	estimated	that	there	are
some	thirty	Conservative	MPs	unwilling	in	any	circumstances	to	tolerate	a	“hard	Brexit”.	If	that	is	so,	they	may	find
themselves	challenged	to	show	their	true	colours	rather	sooner	than	they	would	have	hoped,	at	the	beginning
rather	than	at	the	end	of	the	Brexit	negotiations.	This	will	be	an	unwelcome	and	unexpected	development	for
some	of	them.	It	is	not	however	always	possible	to	put	an	end	to	a	long	period	of	procrastination	at	a	time	of	the
procrastinator’s	choosing.
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An	earlier	version	of	this	post	appeared	on	The	Federal	Trust	and	it	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not
those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Brendan	Donnelly	has	been	Director	of	the	Federal	Trust	since	January	2003	and	is	a	Senior	Research	Fellow	at
the	Global	Policy	Institute.	He	is	a	former	Member	of	the	European	Parliament	(1994	to	1999).
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